We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013).
in the auction as usual. This is called the first-price TIOLI game. 1 R13 shows that under the restriction to continuous and monotonic bribing strategies for player 1, any equilibrium of this game must be trivial-the equilibrium bribing function employed by player 1, if it is continuous and non-decreasing, must be identically zero. In this note, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which a trivial equilibrium exists. These are less stringent than originally proposed.
Let F denote the cumulative distribution function of players' types (valuations). F is atomless, has full support on [0, 1], and its density is f . The following is Theorem 2 from R13. Eső and Schummer (2004) , who study a second-price auction preceded by a bribing stage.
An unfortunate fact regarding this theorem is that it is vacuously true.
Claim 1. There does not exist a distribution F such that 2F (t) + tf (t) ≥ 1 for all t ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Suppose the contrary and choose 0 < ǫ < 1/2. Since F is continuous and F (0) = 0, there existst > 0 such that for all t <t, F (t) < ǫ. Thus, for all 0 < t <t, 2ǫ + tf (t) ≥ 1. However, this implies that for t ∈ (0,t),
Fortunately, Theorem 2's conclusion is true under a relatively weak alternative condition. All that is required is that F is concave. The intuition is that when there is a high probability that bidders have low valuations, player 1 does not find it worthwhile to bribe player 2. This is the same intuition as initially proposed by R13.
Theorem 2 ′ . If F is concave, the first-price TIOLI game has a trivial equilibrium.
To prove this theorem we first establish a useful lemma using a geometric argument.
Lemma 1. Suppose b and x are two positive numbers such that b + x ≤ 1. Then
(1)
Proof. We consider two cases. In case 1, suppose 0 ≤ x ≤ b. We make our argument with reference to Figure 1a . In the figure, b+x 0 F (t)dt is the region below the thick curve, F (t), to the left of b + x. The left-hand side of (1),
Hence, X ≥ D ≥ C as required.
For case 2, suppose 0 ≤ b ≤ x. The situation is as in Figure 1b . Again it is sufficient to show that D ≤ X. This inequality follows since We can now prove Theorem 2 ′ by adapting the argument from the proof of Theorem 2 in R13.
Proof of Theorem 2 ′ . Consider the following strategy profile. Player 1 offers a bribe of zero independent of his type. If this bribe is rejected, he bids as in the one-shot, symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the first-price auction. Irrespective of type, player 2 rejects a bribe of zero and post-rejection bids as in the symmetric BNE of the auction. Player 2 accepts the bribe of b > 0 if and only if his valuation θ 2 ≤ b. If player 2 rejects the bribe b > 0, he believes that player 1 is bidding (θ 2 − b), and he bids (θ 2 − b) + . 2 In this case, player 1 is prescribed his optimal bid in this post-rejection-of-b information set (it is easy to show that such a best-response exists). It is sufficient to verify that player 1 does not have a profitable deviation to a strictly positive bribe. Let b > 0 be the bribe offered by player 1 and let x be player 1's bid in the auction following the (possible) rejection of b by player 2. Obviously, we can assume that x ≤ 1 − b. 3 Given the prescribed (off-equilibrium path) behavior of player 2, the expected payoff of player 1 is
On the equilibrium path, the expected payoff of bidder 1 of type θ 1 is π(θ 1 ) = θ 1 0 F (t)dt. It is sufficient to verify that for all θ 1 and for all 0 < b ≤ θ 1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 − b, it is the case that Π(b, x|θ 1 ) ≤ π(θ 1 ). Let ψ(θ 1 ) ≡ π(θ 1 ) − Π(b, x|θ 1 ). Note that ψ ′ (θ 1 ) = F (θ 1 ) − F (b + x), so ψ has a minimum at θ 1 = b + x. Also, Π(b, x|b + x) = F (b)x + [F (b + x) − F (b)] b. By Lemma 1, ψ(b + x) ≥ 0. Therefore, ψ ≥ 0. Put differently, π(θ 1 ) − Π(b, x|θ 1 ) ≥ 0 for all θ 1 .
